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NOTES
THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENT REGULA-
TORY COMMISSION-STILL UNSOLVED
"The independent regulatory commissions create a confusing and
difficult situation in the field of national administration. There is a
conflict of principle involved in their make-up and functions. They
suffer from an internal inconsistency, an unsoundness of basic theory.
This is because they are vested with duties of administration and policy
determination with respect to which they ought to be clearly and
effectively responsible to the President, and at the same time they are
given important judicial work in the doing of which they ought to be
wholly independent of Executive control."'
To obviate this "inconsistency" the President's Committee on
Administrative Management recommended the division of the func-
tions now being performed by each of the independent regulatory com-
missions into two distinct groups, namely, administrative and policy-
determining on the one hand and judicial and quasi-judicial on the
other-the former to be placed in the hands of agencies within the regu-
lar departmental organization of the government so as to make them
amenable to executive control, the latter to be put in the hands of
agencies independent of executive control except for administrative
"housekeeping" purposes. 2
Professor L. D. White in a discussion of the problem to which
the President's Committee was directing its attention points out by
way of specific example that in some "respects the policy work of the
Interstate Commerce Commission transcends technical problems and
is caught up in the broader aspects of the general social and economic
programs of the government of the day. Here it is that the necessity
for coordination of the policy of the Commission with that of the
government becomes important; and it is at this level, rather than the
level of technical determinations, that the proposal of the (President's)
Committee on Administrative Management is directed. Thus in times
of economic depression or recession railroad rate structures and by
implication employee pay scales are important aspects of adjustment
for recovery. The President must be interested in this area and may
hope that the policy of the Interstate Commerce Commission will be
reasonably consistent with his own broad program of economic rehabili-
tation. In case of conflict he has no administrative recourse. In 1935
the Resettlement Administration undertook to remove the population
'President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report With Special
Studies (1937) 40.21bid., 41.
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from sparsely watered regions of the west to other more promising
agricultural sections. The rate structure on agricultural products from
these areas can be so adjusted as to facilitate or to hamper this
program."'3
Thus the President's Committee recommends in effect that the
Interstate Commerce Commission be reorganized in such a way as to
bring its rate-making functions within the ambit of executive control
with a view towards insuring the coordination of railroad rate policy
with the policies and activities of other governmental agencies.
In short the President's Committee says that in the determination
of railroad rates the policies of the government of the day ought to be
taken into consideration.
But it is precisely considerations of this kind which the Supreme
Court of the United States has indicated may not properly be taken
into account in determining railroad rates.
Thus, in a case which arose upon the application by a railroad
company for authority to increase certain lumber rates, the Interstate
Commerce Commission refused to permit the increase on the ground
that it would adversely affect the lumber business which had been
established in reliance upon the old rates. The Supreme Court held that
the Commission had erred in that its determination had been based
not upon
"the intrinsic unreasonableness of the new rate, * * * but
(upon) the injury it was thought would be suffered from not
continuing the old rate in force, an injury arising from circum-
stances extrinsic to the new rate; that is, a loss which would be
suffered by substituting the higher rate, even if that rate was
in and of itself reasonable and just."4
Or again in a rate discrimination case it was said by way of dicta
"To bring a difference in rates within the prohibition of (the
Statute), it must be shown that the discrimination practiced is
unjust when measured by the transportation standard. In other
words, the difference in rates cannot be held illegal, unless it is
shown that it is not justified by the cost of the respective
services, by their values, or by other transportation conditions." 5
3 WHITE, L. D., INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1939)
118. That Professor Cushman upon whose study the recommendations of the
President's Committee apparently are predicated would agree with these
statements seems clear. See his own remarks with respect to the rate-making
functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission at page 220 in the Presi-
dent's Committee on Administrative Management, Report With Special Studies(1937).
4 Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 433, 445(1911).
5 United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 263 U.S. 515, 525 (1924).
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Finally the Court remarks that carriers may not
"adjust their rates with the motive of impairing or aiding a
shipper, a particular kind of traffic, or a locality, for to do so is
to depart from the transportation standard, conformity to which
the Act contemplates, and substitute others which are prohibited.
A tariff published for the purpose of destroying a market or
building up one, of diverting traffic from a particular place to
the injury of that place, or aid of some other place, is unlawful;
and obviously, what the carrier may not lawfully do, the Com-
mission may not compel."6
In short the Court holds under the statutes as now drawn that
only factors "intrinsic" to the "transportation standard" may be con-
sidered by the Commission in fixing railroad rates.7 This, it is sub-
mitted, precludes the consideration of the policies of the government
of the day. Finally even though the statutes were amended in an
effort to permit such considerations to be taken into account, there
would still remain the constitutional prohibition of rates so low as to
be "confiscatory."" Above that minimum perhaps there is an area within
which Congress would be free to set what standards it might choose
to be considered for rate-making purposes.9
It is not the purpose of the present note to discuss these latter
propositions. Rather its purpose has been simply to indicate the writer's
belief that the President's Committee in its statement of the "prob-
lem" of the independent commissions, and in its solution thereto, failed
to take into consideration the constitutional and statutory limits on the
discretion of at least one of those agencies. It is believed that similar
difficulties would be encountered with respect to the other independent
commissions.
WALLACE MENDELSON*.
6 Texas and Pacific Ry. v. United States, 289 U.S. 627, 637-638 (1933).
7For the fate of Congress' attempt in the Hoch-Smith Resolution (January
30, 1925) as a consequence of the "agricultural depression" of the early
twenties to direct the Interstate Commerce Commission in rate making to
take into consideration "the conditions which at any given time prevail in
our several industries," see Ann Arbor Railroad v. U.S., 281 U.S. 658 (1930).
8 See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), St Louis and O'Fallon R. Co. v.
U.S., 279 U.S. 461 (1929).
9 Does the constitution fix a maximum, as well as a minimum, limitation on
rates? That is, is there a point at which rates might become "confiscatory"
from the point of view of the shipper? This question was raised but not
answered in Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. U.S., 263 U.S. 456, 480 (1924).
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